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number of competences transferred to them from the local 
authorities (communes, departments and regions) on the 
territory of which the metropolis is located. This questions 
the organization of the whole French local system. How-
ever, both the status of metropolises and their legal regime 
(competences and financial regime) do not guarantee the 
reform success. 
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»France does not have enough big cities and is sorry for it.«
(Pierre Mauroy) 
1. Introduction
Both the context of globalisation and the recent efforts to make local 
administration more efficient have shown how costly the weakness of 
French cities has been. Even if this statement must be made more precise, 
to take into account the entire urban architecture (Perben, 2008: 30), it 
should be noted that, Paris being the sole exception, no other French 
city is ranked among the thirteen major European metropolises (Perben, 
2008: 30). There are two main reasons that could perhaps warrant this 
situation. Firstly, the French historical centralisation has hampered the 
development of provincial urban poles and has strengthened the Centre, 
resulting in the concentration of political, social and economic functions 
close to the seats of power. Secondly, the combination of a very strong 
fragmentation of French cities and of the principle of statutory uniformity 
of communes has additionally hindered the emergence of big cities. With 
the very rare exceptions of Paris, Lyon and Marseille,1 large cities (such as 
Lille, Toulouse, Bordeaux or Nice) are governed by the very same status 
as the other communes (Prétot, 1991: 108). »By preventing the city from 
becoming something else than a town or a sum of communes, the legal 
organisation interferes with its development. Not only has it imprisoned 
the city into backward administrative divisions, it is also still delaying the 
institutionalisation of the functional territories that urban practices gener-
ate« (Caillosse, 1995: 89). 
This phenomenon has prompted public authorities into (re)acting. As far 
back as in the 1960s,2 a policy was undertaken to promote balanced me-
tropolises in order to foster the emergence of regional metropolises. In the 
wake of this policy, Paris was given a special status3 and the first »urban 
communities«4 (communautés urbaines) were implemented to solve »the 
urgent issue of the status of the large clustering of ‘multi-towns’ in the 
1  L. n° 82-1169 of 31 December 1982, JORF, December 29, 1982, p. 3914.
2  Article 89 of the Constitution of 27 October 1946 allowed the possibility of working 
rules specific to »big cities«. Nevertheless, it was disregarded.  
3  L. n° 64–707 of 10 July 1964, JORF, 12 July 1964, p. 6204. 
4  L. n° 66-1069 of 31 December 1966, JORF, 4 January 1967, p. 99. 
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French province« (Colard, 1967: 449). More recently, the legislator has 
developed other statuses for towns (Jegouzo, 1992: 101), beginning with 
the creation of the »communities of city« (communautés de ville),5 which 
turned out to be a complete disaster, and continuing with the »communi-
ties of agglomeration« (communautés d’agglomération).6 Despite the failure 
of the communities of city, those devices have enabled the creation of a 
strong network of medium-sized cities and of regional metropolises. Yet, 
those medium-sized cities and regional agglomerations remain too weak 
to allow the French cities to weigh down on the European and worldwide 
competition in which large metropolises are engaged today. In response 
to these new problems, the law reforming the local authorities7 is set to 
create a new institutional framework suited to the most important urban 
areas: the metropolises.
This new public body organizing the cooperation of local authorities8 is 
the result of several years’ discussion. The Balladur Committee for the 
reform of local authorities has advocated the creation of eleven metrop-
olises (Balladur, 2009: 78–82), constituting a completely new category 
of local government with rather wide competences, transferred from the 
communes and other local authorities (mainly departments). For its part, 
the Interministerial Delegation for land settlement and regional competi-
tiveness9 has recommended the creation of twelve metropolises or »met-
ropolitan areas«. The Act that came into force on 16 December 2010 
endorsed those propositions by »recognising the institutional specificity 
of our large agglomerations«10 that are given an ad hoc status: »the me-
tropolis is a public body combining together several towns that are associ-
ated within a space of solidarity to draft and build together an economic, 
ecological, educational, cultural and social land settlement and develop-
ment projects so as to improve competitiveness and cohesion« (Art. L. 
5217–1 of the General Code on Local Authorities,11 GCLA).
5  L. of orientation n° 92–125 of 6 February 1992, JORF, n° 33, 8 February 1992, p. 2064.
6  L. n° 99–586 of 12 July 1999, JORF, 13 July 1999, p. 10361.
7  L. n° 2010–1563 of 16 December 2010, JORF, n° 292, 17 December 2010, p. 22146.
8  Établissement public de cooperation intercommunale (EPCI). 
9  Délégation interministérielle à l’aménagement et à la compétitivité des territoires 
(DIACT). 
10  Presentation of the purposes of the Bill reforming the local authorities, http://www.
senat.fr/leg/pjl09-060.pdf
11  Code general des collectivités territoriales (CGCT).
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The metropolis, as an urban territorial public body, has been given numer-
ous competences transferred to it from the local authorities (communes, 
department and region) existing on the territory where the metropolis is 
located. As a result, its interest goes beyond the sole finalization of the 
communal cooperation map and questions the organization of the whole 
French local system. Indeed, the metropolis introduces a series of settle-
ments that should result in the rewriting – at least partial – of the range 
of competences of the whole territorial framework. However, the actual 
thrust that has been produced by those urban poles remains quite uncer-
tain. Indeed, its ability to reshape the French local system is conditioned 
by the general principles the government adopted in order to design and 
implement the reform. Even though those general principles are thought to 
guarantee the general coherence of the local government reform, they seem 
to hang over the metropolises in a way that appears to be incompatible with 
the purpose of their creation. Both the status of metropolises and their legal 
regime (competences and financial regime) reveal these uncertainties. 
A public body designed for urban areas, the metropolis has made but 
limited changes in the French local system. 
2.  The Metropolis, a Public Body Designed  
for Urban Areas
Designed as a means for French cities to gain European and international 
weight, the metropolis confirms the specific nature of urban areas, renew-
ing the apprehension of the city in the French law. Yet, it is worth noting 
that, once again, the metropolis has been severed from the status of local 
authorities, the government having explicitly refused to give it. 
2.1.  Functional Recognition of the Specificity  
of Urban Spaces
The metropolis was created to make up for two flaws in the French territo-
rial organization. »On the one hand, the French territorial organization 
has not sufficiently taken into account the growing success of the ‘urban 
fact’ and on the other hand, there has continuously been an increased 
competition between large European or international metropolises«.12 
12  Impact assessment attached to the Bill reforming the local authorities, p. 36.
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Beyond the short-term motives, the institutional recognition of the »ur-
ban fact« by the French legislator results from systematic considerations 
and from a constant: in France, the city is still a »minor space« neutral-
ized by law (Caillosse, 1995: 89). Because metropolises are intended to 
change this situation, they aim at taking the legal policy of city organiza-
tion a step further in order to not only take into account but also to allow 
the development of the »urban fact«. To achieve this, it has appeared 
necessary to discard the already existing statuses (communes, communi-
ties of agglomeration and urban communities) ill-fitting to the new forms 
of urban organization. 
This is why the metropolis has originally been conceived as a step beyond 
previous urban forms,13 from which it differs due to its specific functions. 
The different works of Dominique Perben, of the Balladur Committee, 
and of the Interministerial delegation for land settlement and regional 
competitiveness have offered a series of criteria allowing to enhance the 
peculiarity (and consequently the interest) of the metropolis: more than a 
minimal-sized urban area, the metropolis exercises a variety of functions 
(Perben, 2008: 21; Balladur, 2009: 78; D.I.A.C.T., 2009: 30). Accord-
ing to Perben, »four notions are used to [identify a metropolis]: 1- the 
density, the diversity and the diversification of the populations and of 
the activities ...; 2- the networks ...; 3- the power and the attractiveness 
...; 4- the irreversibility: contrary to the city, the metropolis, thanks to its 
diversity and its power, is able to meet the different requirements that its 
development and constraints impose on it« (Perben, 2008: 21–22). The 
Interministerial Delegation for land settlement and regional competitive-
ness, for its part, conveys a similar idea: »to be constituted, the metropolis 
will need to meet [beside the demographic criterion] a set of requirements 
and facilities in order to be internationally competent in part of or in all of 
the following fields of activities: economy, ecology, sciences, technology, 
tourism, culture, and leisure. As a brand new institutional and project-
conveying territory, the metropolitan community would define and imple-
ment a territorial strategy« (D.I.A.C.T., 2009: 30–31). The metropolis is 
thus more than an agglomeration; it is a specific form of urban area whose 
identification goes beyond the sole demographic criteria. 
The Law has thus chosen two criteria to identify the metropolis: the popu-
lation and the metropolitan project. However, the demographic criterion 
13  See the intervention of the Secretary of the Rural Space during the second meeting of 
the National Assembly on 28 May 2010. 
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is the main one: urban areas located outside Île-de-France and consisting 
of more than 500,000 inhabitants in the same spot14 will be able to con-
stitute themselves as a metropolis. This threshold is the result of a heated 
debate where hesitation prevailed over the minimum level of population 
to be chosen to differentiate it from the one necessary to constitute an 
urban community. The discussion about the threshold of minimum popu-
lation to create a metropolis was characterized by the opposition between 
those who advocated a high number (600,000 or even a million inhabit-
ants) and those who considered that too high a threshold would not allow 
the constitution of a sufficient number of metropolises and favoured a 
lower threshold (450,000 – 500,000 inhabitants). Because the Govern-
ment wanted a threshold allowing for the creation of a dozen metropo-
lises, the latter won. This resulted in lining up the level of population of 
metropolises on that of urban communities. For fear the 1992 precedent15 
would repeat itself, the population required for the creation of an urban 
community has been lowered to 450,000 inhabitants; yet the difference 
between the two is not significant enough to enable the metropolis to be 
clearly different from the urban community. The second criterion chosen 
by the legislator confirms this impression. The metropolises constitute »a 
space of solidarity [conceived] to draft and build together an economic, 
ecological, educational, cultural and social land settlement and develop-
ment project so as to improve competitiveness and cohesion« (art. L. 
5217–1 GCLA), while the urban community is defined as »a space of 
solidarity, [conceived] to draft and build ... a common project of urban 
development and land settlement« (art. L. 5215–1 GCLA). Regarding 
those two definitions, the peculiarity of the metropolis does not appear 
really significant. From an optimistic point of view, it can be said that the 
number of details used to define the metropolitan project emphasizes the 
scarcity of details regarding the urban communities, but the difference is 
solely formal and nothing in the definition really distinguishes metropo-
lises from urban communities.
The legislator is thus undertaking to implement a policy of metropoli-
sation without bothering to specify the peculiarities of the urban land-
14  However, an exception is admitted in favor of some »communities of agglomeration« 
that were created before 1st January 2000 on the basis of a derogatory provision of the 12 July 
1999 Act. 
15  The similarity of thresholds necessary for the creation of a community of city or an 
urban community has turned out to be unfavorable to the newest public body (i.e. the commu-
nity of city). 
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scape he is trying to foster, and which justify a great deal of competences 
granted to these structures. The legislator’s lack of imagination should 
regrettably be noted since other countries have shown that the definition 
of metropolitan areas based on socio-economic criterion16 is possible. Ac-
tually, the true peculiarity of metropolises should be visible through the 
competences the legislator intends to transfer to them, since they are to 
monopolize »the structuring competences on their territory«.17 However, 
this is fuelling the discrepancies between the city and its legal representa-
tion, since the same social reality can equally be managed through two 
legal concepts without any clear and indisputable criterion of distinction. 
One of the explanations for this is that the legislator may want to give 
leeway to the executive to implement the law. However, this freedom 
is shocking for two reasons. First, from a methodological point of view, 
it reveals the legislator’s inability to actually define the specificity of the 
metropolis. Secondly, from a normative point of view, the legislator is 
in charge of implementing the autonomy of local authorities, which will 
definitely be challenged by the creation of different metropolises (even if 
the Constitution Council has not adopted this point of view).18 The pur-
pose of the Law is thus less to design a better definition of the city than 
to advocate a new land settlement paradigm that does not clash with the 
already existing inter-communal policy. In that sense, refusing to grant 
the metropolis the status of a local authority is a logical choice. 
2.2.  The Refusal to Grant the Status of a Local  
Authority to the Metropolis
Since the reform »aims at redrawing the administrative divisions of the 
entire territory of the State« (Marcou, 2010: 357), the creation of new 
structures requires their status to be defined. Much to our disappoint-
ment, the legislator has decided not to grant the metropolis the status 
of a new local authority. Since they are part of the process of rationaliza-
16  In Slovenia, the status of urban municipality is thus given to municipalities whose pop-
ulation is over 20,000 inhabitants and that gather more than 15,000 jobs in the third and fourth 
sectors, if they are the center of a geographic, economic and cultural area organized around 
them. 
17  Impact assessment, op. cit., p. 36.
18  Constitutional Council, decision n° 2010–618 D.C. of 9 December 2010, reasons ad-
duced 48–51.
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tion of inter-communal cooperation’s map (Verpeaux, 2009: 410–411), 
metropolises are public bodies. However, both the report of the Balladur 
Committee (Balladur, 2009: 78) and the one penned by the Mission of 
information presided by deputy Jean-Luc Warsmann (Quentin & Urvoas, 
2008: 111) suggested to set them up as local authorities. The Law ad-
opted on 16 December 2010 did not include these propositions. As ex-
plained by the rapporteur of the Legislative Commission at the National 
Assembly, Dominique Perben, this choice was supported by two series of 
motives – legal and political (Perben, 2010: 38). From a legal standpoint, 
even if the creation of a new category of local authority was possible based 
on Article 72 of the Constitution, it would be at odds with the interdiction 
for a local authority to be under the supervision of another one (Marcou, 
2010a: 59; Douence, 2011: 263). From a political standpoint, the upper-
tier local authorities, more particularly departments, feared the competi-
tion of too powerful metropolises.19 However, it has turned out that »after 
a careful reading of the Law, this fear is not grounded since there are 
numerous prerogatives that the departments and regions continue to en-
joy« (Perben, 2010: 38). The Government conveys the impression that 
it aims at settling the territory (i.e. at giving itself new means of action 
to foster its development) without formally challenging the structure of 
decentralization. From that perspective, the fact that the metropolis has 
been given the status of a public body is leeway that saves up appear-
ances. Several provisions of the text convey the idea that, in spite of all 
the prudence expressed by the Government, the previous argument is 
the most fundamental to understand the reform and its thrust. Firstly, 
the Government has refused the authoritative creation of metropolises by 
the law advocated by the Balladur Committee after the model of the first 
urban communities (Balladur, 2009: 79). Secondly, the metropolitan area 
is established on the basis of common articles set forth to create the other 
public bodies of inter-communal cooperation (art. L. 5217–2 GCLA), 
with one exception: the prefect cannot initiate the creation of a metropo-
lis, the initiative belonging to the local councils located on the territory.20 
Notwithstanding this, the prefect is the one that, after talks with the local 
councils concerned, sets the size of the metropolis. The prefect is thus a 
19  For example: »The metropolis is an attack against communes and departments«, Pierre 
Gosnat (Communist Party), Second session of 28 May 2010, National Assembly. 
20  A provision validated by the Constitutional council, decision n° 2010–618 D.C. of 9 
December 2010, reasons adduced 43–47.
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key in the world of local authorities and accounts for the large power of 
the State over entities created by decree (art. L. 5217–2 GCLA).21
Actually, the philosophy and implementation of the policy of metropo-
lises are not far away from those of the urban communities in 1966, only 
the method (the first four urban communities were created by the law), 
the aim (challenging globalization instead of fighting the French desertifi-
cation) and the scale (promoting continental and worldwide metropolises 
instead of solely regional ones) has changed. The modus operandi is overall 
quite identical. Such a similarity can seem surprising since the French 
Republic is now decentralized (see the first article of the French Consti-
tution introduced in 2003). This change of context probably accounts for 
the care taken by the Government to place the reform in the path of the 
previous framework. Despite this, the State is still recycling ideas related 
to centralization to implement the reform of local authorities, revealing 
at the same time a widening gap between the policy of land settlement 
and that of decentralization. Elected local officials, eager to preserve the 
continuity of the former, could very well be reluctant to endorse the latter, 
jeopardizing the success of the policy of metropolises.
Along with the specific status of metropolises, two sets of provisions ques-
tion whether the refusal to grant metropolises the status of local authority 
units is coherent. Indeed, the Law indicates that, just like all public bodies 
of inter-communal cooperation with a specific tax status, the metropoli-
tan deliberative organ will be elected through direct voting (the commu-
nal and inter-communal elections being paired, art. L. 5211–6 GCLA). 
The direct voting should bring about a double evolution bringing closer 
the way metropolises and local authorities function (Wolff, 2011: 1120). 
For one, the voting method should foster the autonomy of metropolitan 
organs in comparison with the communes. If, at first glance, the pairing 
of elections seems justified as a way to preserve the communes, it should 
not be long before a complete turnaround in the situation. As a matter 
of fact, based on the voting method exemplified in Paris, Lyon and Mar-
seille, one can see how the political and democratic importance depends 
on the competences these cities exercise and on the means they have. 
The metropolis, by receiving the main communal competences, should 
soon become the true decision-making centre, dealing with political and 
democratic issues. A new organic logic, in favour of the metropolis, which 
21  For example, the Metropolis of Nice Côte d’Azur was created by a Decree of 17 Octo-
ber 2011, JORF 18 October 2011, p. 17 548.
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will modify the local political space, should be introduced progressively. 
Secondly, a limited introduction of the notion of metropolitan interest22 
(Art. L. 5217–4 GCLA) should not substantially modify this equilibrium, 
contrary to what its advocates23 were anticipating. Its very indeterminacy 
allows for actual political leeway (Caillosse, 2009: 140) that should help 
to qualify the principles of specialty and exclusivity of the metropolis 
(Montain-Domenach, 2009: 95). If it were not understood as a variation 
of the general clause of competence, its ambiguities (Monjal, 2003: 1705; 
Caillosse, 2009: 134) could very well favour the alignment of metropolises 
and local authorities even more. 
Finally, the two chosen criteria are definitely bringing together the me-
tropolis and the local authorities. One could regret the legislator’s refusal 
to deal with those issues as soon as the device was introduced, instead of 
postponing the question of the nature of the most integrated public bod-
ies of inter-communal cooperation and artificially maintaining the status 
quo. The representation of territories, particularly the urban ones, would 
benefit from this effort of clarification. Otherwise, it leaves an impres-
sion of hypocrisy that is at odds with the legitimacy and credibility of the 
reform and of the organs that initiated it. The ambiguities that have been 
spotted in the definition of the status of metropolis reflect on its legal 
regime, including both its competences and its finances. 
3.  The Metropolis, a Limited Change  
of the French Local System 
Conceived as a structuring pillar (D.I.A.C.T., 2009: 33–37), the metropo-
lis should be exercising the main competences on its territory in order 
to implement the conditions of its development. By organizing an un-
precedented degree of interaction of an inter-communal public body, the 
22  As the other territorial public bodies with fiscal competences (for example, Art. L. 
5216–5 GCLA for the community of agglomeration or Art. L. 5215–20 GCLA for the urban 
community), the metropolis has to define its metropolitan interest, i.e. to define the repartition 
of some competences between itself and its members. For the metropolis, only the competence 
of »building, developing, maintaining and functioning of cultural, socio-cultural, socio-educa-
tional and sports facilities« is dependent on the determination of metropolitan interest. All the 
other competences are thus automatically exercised. 
23  See the debate regarding Article 5 of the Bill adopted by the Senate on 4 February 
2010, Meeting on 2 February 2011. 
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metropolis raises a completely new question of its articulation with the 
higher-ranking local authorities (departments and regions). There is the 
risk of competing with the local authorities. However, this impression is 
tempered by the observation of a limited financial resources and tax weak-
ness of the metropolis. 
3.1.  A Centre of Competences Competing with  
Local Authorities
»The metropolis will enable the concentration of structuring competences, 
whether local, departmental, or regional, at the same local level, in order 
to avoid fragmentation of the interests on the metropolitan territory«.24 
The originality of the metropolitan institution stems from its benefiting 
from the competences of the communes participating in the metropolis, 
as well as from those of the local authorities above. Thus, going further 
than before,25 it gives additional weight to inter-communal cooperation. 
However, this does not mean that the metropolis is drifting away from the 
bases and the philosophy of inter-communal cooperation, quite the con-
trary. By trying to »implement the most essential and most sensitive urban 
functions at the most relevant inter-communal scale possible to realize 
genuine synergies« (Muller-Quoy, 2000: 201), it is not clashing with its 
precursors. The metropolitan public body simply gets larger manoeuvring 
space to carry out its functions. This can be seen at two levels, that of the 
communes participating in the metropolis, and at the level of upper local 
authorities. 
Compared to the communes participating in the metropolis, the status 
of the metropolis appears to be hybrid, difficult to calibrate, because the 
desire to promote tightly integrated bodies is blocked by the necessity 
to preserve the communes. It should be noted that, on certain aspects 
at least, the adopted Law is not going as far as the bill presented by the 
Government (itself less daring than the contributions of the Parliament 
and doctrine). A core of competences, built by analogy with the attribu-
tions exercised by urban communities, has nevertheless been granted to 
24  Impact assessment, op. cit., p. 36.
25  Even though since the 5 March 2007 Act on the Prevention of Petty Crime (JORF 
7 March 2007, p. 4297), urban communities can »agree by convention with the department 
... to exercise on its behalf all or part of its competences« in the field of social services (Art. L. 
5215–20, III GCLA).
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metropolises. Article L. 5217–4, I (GCLA) is reproducing, mutatis mutan-
dis, the six major sets of competences of urban communities mentioned in 
Article L. 5215–20 (GCLA): economic, social and cultural development; 
management of the metropolitan area; local housing policy; urban social 
development policy; management of services of general interest; and en-
vironment protection policy and everyday life policy. Moreover, just like 
the other presidents of public bodies of inter-communal cooperation with 
specific tax status, the president of the metropolis is given more powers 
in terms of administrative police at the expense of the mayors (Art. L. 
5211–9–2 GCLA). However, his/her competences are thus not different 
from those of the other inter-communal heads of the executive. As a con-
sequence, the metropolis is not significantly original with regard to the 
communal competences it has been granted. 
The true thrust of the »metropolis« device actually comes from its harvest 
of certain powers of higher-ranking local authorities (departments, re-
gions) and of the Government. The transfers of competences from those 
authorities can be done in two different fashions: they can be carried out 
forthwith (they then come with »the concomitant transfer of the services, 
staff and goods necessary to exercise these competences«) (Douence, 
2011: 263) or conventionally. 
In the first case, metropolises are entrusted, in lieu of the department, 
with the competences of school transportation, of the maintenance of 
public roads belonging to department’s domain, and with the competenc-
es »related to areas of activities and to the promotion of the territory and 
its economic activities abroad« (Art. L. 5217–4, II (GCLA). They are also 
entrusted with the regional competences »related to the promotion of the 
territory and of its economic activities abroad« (same Article, III). Nev-
ertheless, the Law is a step back in comparison with what the Balladur 
Committee or the Warsmann Mission advocated. The former suggested 
that metropolises »exercise, through stipulations of the law that would 
institute them, the entirety of the departmental competences (social and 
community health care, secondary schools, environment ...)« (Balladur, 
2009: 79), while the latter reached a similar conclusion by putting forward 
the merger of the general council and the urban public body (Quentin & 
Urvoas, 2008: 111). The Government could not choose such a solution 
given that it would obviously be in discrepancy with the existing territo-
rial frameworks. Yet, delegating all the departmental competences to the 
metropolis on its territory would unavoidably require »a division of the ex-
isting departments into two entities, with the metropolitan authority with 
a specific status on the one hand, and the rest of the department left on 
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its own on the other« (Balladur, 2009: 79). By refusing to transform the 
metropolises into local authorities and simultaneously to modify the exist-
ing ones, the reform is bound to limit the departmental transfers. Regard-
ing this issue, one should bear in mind that the competences transferred 
ipso jure have to do with how the metropolis organizes its own territory 
whereas the urban competences (in the sense of urbanity) remain in de-
partmental hands. Thus, the metropolis, conceived as a functional space, 
is struggling to become the actual legal embodiment of the city.
Transfers of competences can also be made through the means of a con-
vention that would be negotiated between the metropolis and the local 
authority in order to determine the conditions necessary for those trans-
fers to be carried out. In this case, the metropolis would be able to request 
the department to agree with a convention stating the metropolis would 
exercise the department’s competences concerning social security (the 
transfer can be either full or partial), construction, development, main-
tenance and management of secondary schools, economic development 
(full or partial transfer), tourism, culture and sports. If they are all car-
ried out, those transfers are very likely to deprive the department of an 
actual meaning on the metropolitan territory (Perrin, 2010: 72), while 
the departmental council will still be predominantly made up of members 
coming from the metropolis. In that sense, the decoupling between the 
departmental council members and the exercised competences leads to a 
situation where the metropolitan elected members not only still deliberate 
on departmental public utilities even though they are not related to their 
constituencies, but also still »vote for a budget a great part of which is 
used for the metropolitan budget, pursuant to the terms of the convention 
negotiated between the two public authorities ... All the conditions are 
[thus] met for the department to become the colony of the metropolis!« 
(Douence, 2011: 261). The metropolis can also ask the region to entrust it 
with the construction, development, maintenance and functioning of high 
schools and all or part of the regional competences concerning economic 
development. Finally, the metropolis can ask the Government to transfer 
to it the ownership, maintenance and management of big facilities.26 The 
competences that can potentially be transferred to metropolises are thus 
multiple and quite varied. However, since the metropolis cannot impose 
its will, the possibility of negotiation could turn out to be disadvanta-
geous to it, since the local authorities, and especially the regional ones, 
26  »Those transfers are done for free and shall not be done in exchange for any indemnity, 
right, tax, salary or fee«.
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»are either [able] to decline the metropolitan plea for competence, or ... 
to negotiate a convention for a very limited transfer« (Deschamps, 2011: 
1135). The power of metropolises is far from being certain.
The parliamentary debates about competence transfers add to this im-
pression of uncertainty regarding the roles and functions given to me-
tropolises. The criticisms are pointed at two competences that shed light 
on how difficult it is to overcome the status quo. Thus, the transfer of 
the department’s social competence raised questions on whether it was 
relevant. The criticisms that invoke the discrepancy between the general 
direction given regarding the competences of metropolises and the field 
of social action (Krattinger & Gourault, 2009: 32) have led to set aside 
the automatic aspect of the transfer to metropolises, since social compe-
tence is only optional for the metropolis. Beyond the arguments on the 
appropriateness of such a transfer, it is unquestionably hampered by the 
Government’s refusal to challenge the existing territorial framework – the 
metropolis is indeed substantially challenging the mere existence of the 
department. Similar doubts are cast regarding the transfer of economic 
competences to metropolises. These are leading to the principled limited 
transfer, since only some of the economic competences are granted au-
tomatically, while metropolises have to negotiate further transfers with 
the department and the region. This is actually very unlikely to happen. 
Indeed, the division of economic competences raises the question of the 
role given to the metropolis within the regional territory. Is it necessary to 
make the metropolis a distinctive and particular centre of development by 
granting it all the economic competences – and thus risk excluding it from 
the rest of the regional territory? Or should it be integrated into the re-
gional politics that would guarantee the development and planning of the 
territory on a larger scale? The division chosen by the Law clearly favours 
the second option, given that the metropolises are intended as the driv-
ing force of a bigger territory rather than for their own sake. This seems 
to find a confirmation in their »[automatic] association to the drafting, 
revision and modification of planning schemes and documents in the field 
of development, transportation and environment ... when those schemes 
and documents have a consequence or impact on the territory of the me-
tropolis« (Art. L. 5217–4, IV GCLA). 
In the reform spirit, the metropolis constitutes a centre, both rival and 
complementary to local authorities, which has to be promoted without 
disrupting the existing equilibrium. Dressing the metropolis without un-
dressing the local authorities, is what is at stake. Nevertheless, this at-
tempt to preserve the original territorial equilibrium is leading to a quasi-
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inert device whose concrete difference from the urban community is not 
substantial enough to be appealing (Marcou, 2010a: 64). 
3.2.  The Preservation of the Tax and Financial  
Existence of the Communes, Weakness of  
the Metropolises’ Finances
Along with its competences, the finances of the metropolis are confirm-
ing how difficult it is to implement a new territorial institution without 
modifying the existing structures. The different steps leading from the 
governmental Bill to the final text provide a particularly useful insight on 
the doubts and difficulties in promoting an innovative project on the basis 
of established constitutional law. 
The original version of the Bill arranged a genuine »metropolitan tax fed-
eralism« that would have been very favourable to the metropolis. It was 
anticipated that the metropolis would indeed be automatically given the 
result of direct local taxes,27 the result of taxes corresponding to the com-
petences having been transferred and the governmental grants redirected 
to the metropolis instead of the member-communes. The communes, for 
their part, would only benefit from a grant paid by the metropolis.28 If this 
financial and tax economy was warranted by »the transfer of competences 
from the communes to the metropolis«,29 the financial and tax integration 
resulting from it would deprive the communes of any financial autonomy 
under the terms of Article 72–2 of the Constitution. This meant running a 
risk of unconstitutionality. Moreover, the experience of the community of 
cities had already shown that a financial and tax regime too favourable to 
any public body discouraged from resorting to this device. By promoting 
a financial structure that corresponded more strongly to a federative local 
authority than to a public body, the Bill appeared legally and politically 
too radical. 
The Senate, willing to re-establish an equilibrium far more respectful of 
the communal autonomy (Courtois, 2009: 77), thus went back to the 
27  According to Article L. 5217–12 (GCLA) as drafted in the Bill reforming local authori-
ties, n° 60, p. 38. 
28  Art. L. 5217–21, paragraphs 2 and 3 (GCLA) as drafted in the Bill reforming local 
authorities, n° 60, p. 42.
29  Art. L. 5217–21, paragraph 1(GCLA), op. cit. 
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governmental Bill, as soon as its first reading of the text had finished, by 
aligning the financial regime of the metropolises with that of urban com-
munities30 and by re-establishing the previous rights of the communes 
(concerning their financial grants). The National Assembly undertook to 
present a median legal regime, built on the primacy of the metropolis in 
terms of grants31 and on the transfer of the sole ad valorem tax on unde-
veloped sites (taxes foncières sur les propriétés non bâties),32 but this did not 
win the senators over. This is why the finally adopted tax and financial 
regime of metropolises is almost identical to that of urban communities. 
The abandonment of metropolitan tax federalism suggested by the Gov-
ernment threatens to deprive the metropolis of any genuine financial dis-
tinctive identity in comparison to other public bodies with a specific tax 
status. Moreover, keeping in mind how important financial incentives are 
for the success of inter-communal cooperation, the legislative device does 
not appear to be encouraging enough to prod the communal representa-
tives into creating metropolises. If the governmental Bill was going too 
far (given the legal background), the parliamentary lack of boldness, as 
far as senators are concerned, did the exact same thing in the opposite 
direction. 
The legislator’s refusal to grant the status of a local authority to the me-
tropolis is causing a backlash: tax federalism between a public body and 
local authorities is inconceivable according to the current Constitution. 
However, establishing the metropolis as a local authority, by substantially 
reorganizing its area, was a way to ensure significant tax resources and to 
clarify the administrative map. On the contrary, and as several members 
of Parliament have noted, the modification is not really making things 
simpler. Moreover, there is an actual risk that the creation of metropolis’ 
structuring institutions that would appeal to the communal representa-
tives will fail. Additionally, without a genuine financial and tax capacity, 
the metropolis will not come into the world and will not be able to be-
come the driving force of the economic development of its territory, thus 
thwarting the reform (Marcou, 2010: 368; Douence, 2011: 265).
30  Art. L. 5217–13 (GCLA) as drafted in the Bill adopted by the Senate on 4 February 
2010. 
31  Only the local grant was paid directly to the communes. 
32  Art. L. 5217–12 (GCLA) as drafted in the text of the Commission of Laws, op. cit., p. 
23. It was also receiving the amount of taxes corresponding to the transferred competences. 
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4.  Conclusion – An Uncertain Move Subjected  
to the Test of Time
Two series of uncertainties are hanging over the reform. First, choosing to 
make the metropolis a public body raises questions: the status of a territo-
rial public body is highly political, and distorts what the metropolis really 
is. Bearing in mind the criticisms regarding the category of territorial pub-
lic bodies, it can be noted that »neither the qualification of public body 
matches the features of the association at hand ... nor to the aimed target 
set by the legislator« (Laubadère, 1974: 435). Moreover, »the reasons put 
forward to warrant the qualification of public body [given to metropo-
lises] are groundless: [metropolises] are federative local authorities; they 
exemplify an administrative federalism« (Laubadère, 1974: 441), as can 
be seen in the financial regime that is part of the initial Bill. Finally, »the 
resort to the qualification of a public body has drawbacks as far as local 
rights and democracy are concerned« (Laubadère, 1974: 445), given that 
local democracy has to be organized within the previous framework even 
though the level of exercise of the power changes (Rémond, 2009: 16). In 
the end, the policy behind metropolises raises a very redundant question: 
should the communes have been saved in the urban areas? However, it 
goes without saying that by maintaining the communes within the area 
of metropolitan agglomerations, the Law is still lagging behind the social 
reality. It is a pity that a reform purportedly aiming at making things more 
simple would not take this into account since »we [undoubtedly] have no 
more than a legal representation that is a far cry from the institutional re-
alities« (Caillosse, 2009: 169). Unless the legislator has strategically »bet 
on the decline of the commune or the department at the benefit of the 
inter-communal public body« (Degoffe, 2005: 136), those observations 
bring about a second uncertainty regarding the motive for the creation of 
metropolises. The commentators are thus very careful with regard to the 
effects of metropolises and are all underscoring the discrepancy between 
the political ambitions and the legal instrument that has been chosen. 
However, it may be too soon to be too harsh on the reform. After all, me-
tropolises »are undoubtedly innovative but not revolutionary. The legisla-
tor could have imagined something more creative. He has shown prudence 
and moderation both urgent and necessary in this reform. The experience 
and functioning of the institution will perhaps reveal that the main faults 
of the system stem from the fact that the [metropolis] is a copycat of the 
current French inter-communal regime. Nevertheless, the institution that 
has just been born should not be condemned. ‘History will step in as an 
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accelerator as always, just like it does in more important fields’ (Marcel 
Waline)« (Colard, 1967: 461). These words, written in 1967 about urban 
communities remain relevant to the reform implemented by the Law of 
December 2010 and remind the legislator and the observers that only the 
judgment of time matters. »The legislator has done his duty, time will do 
its own«, Gambetta used to say (Colard, 1967: 461). These words deserve 
to be pondered over once again.
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The sTaTus of meTroPolises in france
summary
since the 1960s, a policy has been undertaken to promote balanced metropolises 
in order to foster the emergence of regional metropolises. The law of 2010 cre-
ated metropolises to enable the most important urban areas to enter into world-
wide city competition. They have been given a number of competences transferred 
to them from the local authorities (communes, departments and regions) on the 
territory of which the metropolis is located. This questions the organization of the 
whole french local system. however, both the status of metropolises and their 
legal regime (competences and financial regime) do not guarantee the reform 
success. 
Key words: local self-government – france, worldwide city competition, urban 
areas, metropolitanisation policy, metropolises
sTaTus meTroPola u francusKoJ
sažetak
od 1960-ih u francuskoj se provodi politika promocije uravnotežene struk-
ture metropola da bi se ojačale regionalne metropole. Zakon iz 2010. je stvorio 
metropole kako bi se najvažnijim urbanim područjima omogućilo da se natječu 
s velikim svjetskim gradovima. Dodijeljene su im velike ovlasti, prijenosom od 
strane općina, departmana i regija na čijem su području smještene. To stavlja 
pod znak pitanja čitav sustav lokalne samouprave u francuskoj. ipak, ni status 
metropola ni pravni režim kojem su podvrgnute (njihove ovlasti i financije), ne 
garantiraju uspjeh metropolitanizacijske reforme.
Ključne riječi: lokalna samouprava – francuska, natjecanje velikih svjetskih 
gradova, urbana područja, politika metropolitanizacije, metropole 
